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Dean: Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal

CONTRACT SUPPORT FUNDING AND THE
FEDERAL POLICY OF INDIAN TRIBAL SELFDETERMINATION
S. Bobo Dean* and Joseph H. Webster**

INTRODUCTION

The federal policy of Indian tribal self-determination is now 30 years old. It

was initiated by President Richard Nixon in his Message on Indian Affairs to
Congress in 19701 and implemented through the enactment of the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act (the "ISDEAA"), five years later.2
In many respects the policy has been remarkably successful. Its achievements
certainly compare favorably with prior federal Indian policies for humaneness of
intention (extermination, allotment, assimilation, and termination), as well as for
practical impact and durability (the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on
tribal autonomy in Worcester v. Georgia3 in 1832 and its affirmation of tribal selfgovernment in Ex Parte Crow Dog4 in 1883).

The General Accounting Office reports that approximately $1 billion of
Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") programs (or 64 percent of the BIA budget in
fiscal year 1997) and $892 million of the health programs funded by the Indian
Health Service (or 45 percent of the IHS program in fiscal year 1998) are
administered by tribal governments, tribal consortia, or tribal agencies under the

* S. Bobo Dean: (B.A., Yale University; B.A., Oxford University; L.L.B., Yale Law School) is a
partner in the Washington D.C. firm of Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, LLP and has specialized in
representing Indian tribes and tribal organizations since 1965. He testified in support of the ISDEAA
in 1975 and in favor of many of the subsequent amendments. He has represented tribes in negotiating
ISDEAA contracts and self-governance agreements with BIA and IHS and has taught Indian law
courses at George Washington University Law School and New York University Law School.
*'Joseph H. Webster: (B.A., with honors, Purdue University; J.D., with honors, George Washington
University) is an associate with Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, LLP. Mr. Webster has negotiated selfgovernance agreements with I-S and represented tribes in litigation and legislative representation
involving contract support issues.
1. See Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, PUB. PAPERS 564,567 (July 8, 1970).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. (1975).
3. 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832); See also GRANT FORMAN, INDIAN REMOVAL: THE EMIGRATION OF
THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRmEs 229, 294 (University of Oklahoma Press 1945) (The Worcester decision
was followed a few years later by the deportation of most of the Cherokee people from their "nation").
4. 109 U.S. 556 (1883). After Ex Parte Crow Dog, Congress enacted a federal criminal law
applicable to Indians in the "Indian country."
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ISDEAA, in place of the federal government 5 The self-determination policy has
been described
"as the most successful Indian policy [ever] adopted by the United
6
States.",
The ISDEAA directed the Department of the Interior ("DOI") and the
Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") to contract with tribes to
operate programs for the benefit of their members. While the agencies could
decline to contract, they could only do so based on three statutory criteria and by
providing the tribal applicant with an "opportunity for appeal on the objections
raised."' Contracts were to be in general conformity with federal procurement
laws except that DOI and DHHS were granted the authority to waive inconsistent
contracting laws and regulations.9 Other provisions included, but were not limited
to the following: advance payments and the right to retain interest on advances;
contract terms for up to three years; the right of tribes to retrocede contracts to
the agencies; the use of federal facilities by federal contractors; and that funding
should not be less than the federal agency had available to operate the program.10
Contracts could be rescinded and programs reassumed by the federal
agencies, but only for "violation of the rights or endangerment of the health,
safety or welfare of any person" or "gross negligence or mismanagement in the
handling or use of funds .... ,

The ISDEAA also provided that it was not to be

interpreted "as (1) affecting, modifying, diminishing or otherwise impairing the
sovereign immunity from suit enjoined by an Indian tribe; or (2) authorizing or
requiring the termination
of any existing trust responsibility with respect to the
12
people.,
Indian
Fundamentally, the ISDEAA remains very much as it was when enacted
originally in 1975. However, major overhauls occurred in 1988, 1994, and 2000."3
These changes focused primarily on strengthening the leverage of tribes to
exercise self-determination rights. Important changes in the ISDEAA include the
following:
* in 1988 the provision of "contract support" funding as an addition to
program funds under ISDEAA contracts was put on a statutory basis by the
enactment of section 106(a)(2) 14;
e limitations were enacted in 1988 on the right of the federal agency to
5. See Indian Self Determination Act: Shortfalls in Indian Contract Support Costs Need to be
Addressed, GAORCED 99-150 at 37 (June 1999)(hereinafter "GAO Report").
6. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida, Chairman Billy Cypress, Prepared Statement Before
the House Resource Committee (Aug. 3,1999).

7. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f, 450g (1983).
8. Id. §§ 450f(b), 450g(b).

9. Id. § 450j (a).
10. Id. § 450j(b)-(e), (I).

11. Id. § 450m.
12. Id. § 450n.
13. Indian Self-determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-

472, 102 Stat. 2285; ISDEAA Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250; ISDEAA
Amendments of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-260.
14. ISDEAA Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-42, 102 Stat. 2285 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 450j-l(a)(2) (2000)).
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reduce funding levels either in the current or future years15;
e the Federal Tort Claims Act was extended to suits against tribal
contractors based on tort claims arising out of the performance of an ISDEAA
contract for both medical malpractice (1987) and other tort claims (1990), the
requirement to obtain liability insurance was eliminated and the DOI and DHHS
were directed to provide for insurance coverage for all ISDEAA contractors1 6;
* two additional declination criteria were added in 1994:
(1) if the funding level requested exceeded the amount available and (2) if
the proposed contract activity was beyond the scope of the Act because the
activity would be illegal17;
* tribal rights to appeal declination or other agency decisions affecting tribal
rights under the contract or the statute either administratively or directly to
federal court have been strengthened 8;
- the requirement to comply with federal procurement laws (except to a
limited extent in construction contracts) were eliminated in 1994 and a series of
laws, regulations and executive orders were expressly waived19 ;
* special cost principles deviating in some ways from those approved by the
office of Management and Budget (OMB) were included in the ISDEAA
Amendments in 199420;
* the Secretaries were required in 1994 to develop regulations under the Act
by negotiated rulemaking and a mandatory contract clause generally supportive of
tribal self-determination were prescribed by law.2 '
In 1988 a model demonstration "tribal self-governance project" was enacted
under which tribes were given greater authority to redesign programs funded by
DOI and IHS and special provision was made for accessing funds from Area and
Central offices. 22 In 1994 a new title was added to make the self-governance
project permanent with respect to DOI programs. 3 This year, a new Title V
provided for a permanent self-governance program at IHS. 24
15. 25 U.S.C. §450j(b) (2000).
16. ISDEAA Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-644, 104 Stat. 466 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 450f (2000)); Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987); Pub. L. No. 101-512, §314, 104 Stat.
1923 (1990).
17. ISDEAA Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 108-413, 108 Stat. 4250 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 450f(a)(2)(D) & (E) (2000)).
18. 25 U.S.C. § 450m-1 (2000).
19. Id. § 450j(a).
20. Id. § 450j(j).
21. Id. §§ 450k, 4501.
22. Id. § 450f Note.
23. Tribal Self-governance Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4270 (codified as

amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa-458hh (2000)). Curiously, in 1994 when the self-governance project
was made permanent for DOI, many of the shortcomings of the old Title I contracting program were
corrected by some of the amendments noted above and it became clear that in some respects tribes had

more leverage under Title I than under the self-governance titles. As a result, the ISDEAA was
amended in 1996 to allow any tribe entering into a self-governance agreement to elect to include any
provision of Title I. 25 U.S.C. § 458(c). Thus, the distinction between Titles I, III, and IV became
complex in the sense that these are not necessarily discrete programs with sharply distinguished

requirements.
24. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub L. No. 106-260,114 Stat. 711 (2000).
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Notwithstanding these repeated reaffirmations of the policy, many
challenges remain. Many tribes have so far chosen not to take advantage of the
opportunities for tribal self-government available under the ISDEAA.
Deficiencies in program funding (as distinct from contract support) discourage
tribes from taking over responsibility for federally funded Indian service
programs.2 As Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Gover has pointed
out: "The problem is there is simply not enough money appropriated by Congress
to provide the tribes with the resources they need to fix the problems in Indian
country." 26
This Article focuses on a major unresolved issue that presently impairs the
effectiveness of the self-determination policy. The ISDEAA, as amended in 1988,
provides that tribes are to receive no less than the federal agency would have
otherwise had to operate a program plus an additional increment to cover costs
which the federal government does not incur, or which it covers from some source
not under contract.27 However, it has been held that the congressional directive is
subject to available appropriations, 2s and Congress has not usually provided
sufficient funds to meet this negotiated obligation.29 This issue has continuously
surfaced throughout the entire history of the policy, and led Congress in 1999 to
impose a one-year moratorium on any new self-determination contracts. This
Article reviews how this problem arose and suggests how it can be addressed in a
manner which furthers, rather than hinders, the movement toward tribal selfgovernment.
A.

Background.

In 1987, the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs identified the inability of

25. See A Study of ContractSupport Costs in the Bureau ofIndian Affairs and Recommendationsfor
Reform, Report of the BIATribal Workgroup on Tribal Needs Assessment, at Executive Summary 9
(June 1999) ("While tribes continued to contract and compact Bureau programs, the trend has not
increased significantly in recent years, most of which are attributable to contract support shortfalls and
limitations in direct program funds").
26. Statement of Assistant Secretary Kevin Gover to the National Congress of American Indians, at
5 (Oct. 7, 1999).
27. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-1(a)(2) provides:
There shall be added.., contract support costs which shall consist of an amount for the
reasonable costs for activities which must be carried on by a tribal organization as a
contractor to ensure compliance with the terms of the contract and prudent management,
but which (A) normally are not carried on by the respective Secretary in his direct operation
of the program; or (B) are provided by the Secretary in support of the contracted program
from resources other than those under contract.
28. See Babbitt v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Pub. Safety Dep't., 194 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
29. See The Tribal Contract Support Cost: Hearing on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. On
Resources, 106th Cong. (May 16,2000) (testimony of W. Ron Allen, Vice President, National Congress
of American Indians).
Chief among [the problems in implementing the ISDEAA], as long recognized by this
Committee, has been the consistent failure of the BIA and IHS to fully fund the contract
support costs required to carry out these federal programs. That failure has penalized Native
American communities - the real and ultimate victims of the shortfall - by forcing
reductions in tribal programs in order to cover the federal government's responsibilities.
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many tribal contractors to obtain adequate reimbursement for the required
administrative/overhead costs associated with operating federal programs under
the ISDEAA as "the single most serious problem with implementation of the
Indian self-determination policy.. ,,'O The inability to recover these largely
fixed costs (called "contract support costs" under the ISDEAA) has imposed a
financial penalty on tribal contractors, forcing tribes to divert scarce program
funds to cover the shortfalls, thereby reducing the level of services provided to
tribal members. As noted in a 1999 report by the General Accounting Office:
Shortfalls in funding for contract support costs have adversely affected
tribes in various ways, depending on the number and type of methods the
tribes used to compensate for such shortfalls .... For example, in addition
to cutting back on their indirect expenditures as much as possible, they
have also had to dip into tribal resources and program resources to
compensate for the shortfalls. As a result of such measures, the tribes'
administrative infrastructures (e.g., personnel, computer systems, and
accounting systems) have deteriorated; opportunities to improve the tribes'
economic conditions have been lost; and program services have been
diminished.
The imposition of such a penalty on tribes who exercise their selfdetermination rights 32 is inconsistent with Congress' commitment to "supporting
and assisting Indian tribes in the development of strong and stable tribal
governments, capable of administering quality programs and developing the
economies of their respective [reservations]. 33
As explained below, the importance of contract support to the policy of
Indian self-determination remains recognized by the BIA and the IHS, as well as
the Congress. Nevertheless, administrative and statutory barriers have prevented
tribal contractors from fully recovering such costs. The three most significant
barriers are: (1) inadequate appropriations, (2) the failure of other federal
agencies to honor negotiated indirect cost rates, and (3) refusal of the BIA to pay
direct contract support costs (i.e., costs which are not based on the negotiation of
an indirect cost rate but qualify as "contract support" as defined in the
ISDEAA).34

30. S. REP. No. 100-274, at 8 (1987), reprintedin 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2620,2627.
31. GAO Report, supra note 5, at 39.
32. The impact of such shortfalls on the Gila River Indian Community is illustrative:
We estimate our unfunded contract support need from fiscal year 1996 to the present at
between $9 million and $11 million. As concluded by GAO, NCAI and others, we can
affirm that these unfunded contract support costs further jeopardize our underfunded health
care program. (By IHS statistics, our Community's federal health program is funded at only
54% of need).
Gila River Indian Community Lieutenant Governor Richard P. Narcia, Prepared Testimony Before
the House Resources Committee (May 16,2000).
33. Tribal Self-Governance Amendments of 2000 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b)
(2000)).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-l(a)(2) (2000).
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Both the BIA and the IHS Have Recognized That ContractSupport is Critical
to the Successful Implementation of the Indian Self-Determination Policy.35
1.

Early BIA Efforts to Address the Need for Contract Support.

In 1976 the Bureau began providing contractors with contract support
funding on Indian Self-Determination Act contracts from a budget item entitled
"Contract Support Funds" ("CSF"). The Bureau explained the basis on which it

had decided to allocate to tribal contractors additional funds beyond the amount
that the Secretary would have had at the local level to operate a contracted
program in its "Procedural Guidelines on 25 CFR 271" issued in April 1977.36 In
Chapter 6 of the guidelines, the BIA stated that "contract support" funds would
be provided to cover the additional administrative costs incurred as a result of

tribal organizations contracting to operate Bureau programs. It made clear that
these funds were provided "to prevent program deterioration, [and] not for
program enhancement [or expansion]." 37
In the guidelines, the BIA also stipulated that normal contract support funds
would be provided based on a negotiated indirect cost rate. In only certain special
circumstances would such funds be provided based on a lump sum negotiation
(small contracts where no indirect cost rate has been negotiated). 38 The BIA also
stated that all allowable indirect costs could be paid from the contract support
",39
item in the BIA budget "[b]ecause of their 'administrative' nature ....

35. An earlier version of this section was included as Chapter 1 of the FinalReport of the National
Congress of American Indians National Policy Work Group on Contract Support Costs (July 1999),
which the authors assisted in drafting (hereinafter "NCAI Report").
36. Procedural Guidelines on 25 C.F.R. § 271: Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance
Act (April 1977).
37. Id. at 6-1.
38. Id. at 6-4. IHS Circular 2000-01 explains the difference between lump-sum and indirect cost
negotiations. These descriptions are equally applicable to the BIA.
(i) Awardees With Negotiated IDC Rates. The amount of IDC expected to be incurred by
awardees utilizing rates negotiated with the cognizant Federal agency, will be determined by
applying the negotiated rate(s) to the appropriate direct cost base amount ....
(ii) Awardees Without NegotiatedIDC Rates (Guidelinesfor Agency Negotiators). A lump
sum amount for "indirect types of costs" may be computed for awardees that do not have
formally negotiated agreements with their cognizant Federal agency for reimbursement
under an IDC rate. This annual lump sum amount may be calculated by negotiating a fixed
amount for "indirect types of costs." Categories of costs most often considered "overhead"
or "indirect type" are generally in the categories of Management and Administration,
Facilities and Equipment, and General Services and Expenses.
IHS Circular 2000-01, § 5(A)(2)(c). See also OMB Circular No. A-87, Attachments A and E, 60 Fed.
Reg. 26484, 26492, 26504-07 (1995); JAMEs M. SIZEMORE, DETERMINING THE TRUE COST OF
CONTINUING FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR INDIAN TRIBES 14-15 (2d ed. 1997), RONALD MILLER, COST
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 38-41 (1985), and COST PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING
COST ALLOCATION PLANS AND INDIRECT COST RATES FOR AGREEMENTS WITH THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT - A GUIDE FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, ASMB-C-10 (1997) (concerning the negotiation of
indirect costs).
39. Procedural Guidelines on 25 C.F.R. § 271: Indian Self-Determination and Education Act, at 6-4.
In its annual budget requests to Congress the Bureau has further explained its position that the original
statute required the allocation of contract support funds. For example, in the fiscal year 1986
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In its fiscal year 1986 budget request the BIA responded to inquiries from
the Congressional committees about increases in contract support costs of selfdetermination contracts by stating:
The principal function of contract support has been to pay tribes
the incremental costs they incur as a result of entering into Public
Law 93-638 contracts. Since the inception of tribal contracting
there has been a steady yearly increase in the dollar volume and
program scope of tribal contracting. In 1976 approximately 198
tribal contractors conducted 679 contracts with total value of
$68,390,300. In fiscal year 1984 some 400 tribal contractors
entered into 1,400 separate contracts for a total of approximately
$245,000,000.40

The concerns to which the BIA responded in its fiscal year 1986 budget
request go back at least as far as 1980 when the Senate Appropriations Committee
directed the BIA to work with the DOI Office of Inspector General to develop a
system which would prevent shortfalls in the indirect costs it had agreed to pay to
tribal self-determination contractors. The resulting study in 1981 concluded that
shortfalls were due to the lack of contract support funds to cover actual costs, and
that the problem was accentuated by the failure of federal agencies other than
BIA and IHS4 1 to honor negotiated indirect cost rates and pay their share of
indirect costs.
No legislative proposals were sent to Congress to address the "shortfall" as a
result of the 1981 BIA study. However, on July 13, 1983, the DOI Inspector
General, after analyzing the administrative costs of eighty-one tribes over a fiveyear period, concluded that there were two major factors responsible for the fortyseven percent increase in the amount of negotiated indirect costs between 1979
and 1983: "First, Indian tribes have been trying to improve their administration
and comply with Federal requirements. This costs more money. Second,
administrative costs tend to be more fixed than variable." 42
Thus, the Inspector General did not find the increases to be unreasonable.
Moreover, the Inspector General recognized that administrative costs are
generally fixed, which means that a reduction in a program does not43 necessarily
lead to a proportionate reduction in the required administrative costs.
While making no recommendations, the Inspector General predicted that:
Department of Interior Budget Justifications, the Bureau relied on the provisions of then section

106(h) which mandated that the amount of funds provided under self-determination contracts "shall
not be less than the Bureau would have otherwise provided for his direct operation of the program."
FY 1986 DOI Budget Justifications, at BIA-104.

The Bureau thus interpreted this statutory

requirement to mean that funding for services should not be reduced by requiring tribes to spend such
funds for administrative activities that the agencies had not been required to perform or which they

had funded from other sources.
40. F.Y. 1986 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-103.
41. Report to the Senate Committee on Appropriations: Bureau of Indian Affairs ContractSupport

Delivery Process 11-12, 16-17 (Feb. 1981).
42. Trend Analysis Using DataAvailable from the IndirectCost Negotiation Process, DOI Inspector

General (July 15, 1983).
43. Id.
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"Indirect costs will continue to increase," and that "those tribes predominantly
dependent on the Federal government will experience great difficulty unless some
fundamental changes are made in the financing process." 44 The Inspector General
predicted that "the more affluent tribes will be able to operate without difficulty
by using their own resources for administration., 45 Thus the Inspector General
recognized that the effect of under-funding negotiated indirect costs would be to
impose a financial penalty on those tribes able to afford it for the exercise of their
self-determination rights under the ISDEAA, while most tribes would be required
46
to dip into program funds or do without essential management functions.
On November 3, 1983, the DOI Inspector General followed up on this report
with a letter to the Office of Management and Budget in which he reported the
BIA decision to "grandfather" indirect cost dollars into a tribe's recurring base so
that after the first year of a contract, indirect costs would be paid off the top of the
total contract amount.47 While the Inspector General expected that this approach
would be useful in encouraging tribes to develop "more efficient administrative
systems" (i.e., less costly administration) he also stated: "The heavy and
inconsistent requirements of the federal bureaucracy are jeopardizing the ability
of Indian Tribes to handle
federal programs, particularly those tribes with limited
48
resources of their oWn.
The Inspector General requested OMB's assistance to consider the following
options: (1) provide generally for lump sum rather than indirect cost rate
negotiations; (2) lift administrative restrictions to permit other federal agencies to
fund negotiated indirect costs in full; and most significantly, (3) "a legislative
remedy vesting the Secretary with the authority to promulgate appropriate
regulations... to eliminate inconsistencies. 49 While the problems identified by
the Inspector General in the 1983 report and letter remain, none of the three
options proposed in the letter have been implemented.
Beginning in fiscal year 1985, the Bureau adopted a policy of
"grandfathering" contract support. Under this policy, contractors would receive a
one-time increment of funding in the first year of a self-determination contract.
This one-time increment would be included in the tribe's recurring base, and the
tribal contractor would be expected to take indirect costs off the top of the
recurring base in later years. The Bureau explained this new approach in a letter
to Tribal Leaders stating that it would "allow tribal contractors to receive total
funding from program sources to meet both the direct and indirect costs of their
contracts."50 As a result of this mandate, the BIA received $37,032,000 in contract

44. Id.
45. Id.

46.
47.
1983).
48.
49.

Id.
Letter from Richard Mulberry, DOI Inspector General, to Deputy Director, OMB, (Nov. 3,
Id.
Id.

50. F.Y. 1985 Budget Justifications, at BIA 103-107; "Dear Tribal Leader" Letter from Assistant

Secretary, Indian Affairs, to Tribal Leaders (Jan. 13, 1984); Memorandum from Acting Deputy
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support for ongoing contracts (to be merged with program funds in the tribal
recurring base) and $1,666,000 that would be available to provide contract support
funds for new contracts in fiscal year 1984 and 1985.51
For fiscal year 1985, the Bureau also addressed two recommendations of the
American Indian Law Center. The first of the recommendations was that contract
support should be used to pay the BIA's overhead costs to tribal contractors
(ignoring activities which a contractor must perform, and the federal agency is not
BIA
required to perform). The second recommendation was that the overall
52
contractor.
new
each
for
used
rate
the
be
should
%
15.5
of
rate
overhead
The Bureau eventually rejected this approach, explaining: "To use a single
uniform rate for all contracts simply cannot take into consideration a number of
variables such as programmatic differences, large and small tribe factors,
geographic locations and a number of distinguishing elements which vary from
contract to contract." 53 The Bureau decided to base its request for new contract
support funds on the 15.5% rate, but to distribute the funds based on indirect cost
negotiations so as to reflect the specific reasonable need of each contractor.
Under this new system, each contractor would be required to absorb increases
based on program expansions or other changes, resulting in increases in
negotiated indirect costs for ongoing contracts after the first year of the contract.
The "grandfathering" innovation implemented by the BIA in fiscal year 1985
did not resolve the contract support shortfall problem. There were many reasons
for this. Conceptually, the approach was flawed as shown by BIA's statement that
"grandfathering" would allow tribes to receive "total funding from program
54
sources to meet both direct and indirect costs of their contracts.
"Grandfathering" would simply authorize tribes to take increases in their
negotiated indirect costs from program funds. Tribes recognized a considerable
risk in the new approach because increases in negotiated indirect costs in future
years occurred for reasons beyond tribal control. Additionally, tribes discovered
that the amount actually "grandfathered" was $5,000,000 less than the full amount
55
required to fund negotiated indirect costs for the first year. In its request for
fiscal year 1987, BIA admitted that it had underestimated the amount of new
contracts in fiscal year 1986 by $10,000,000.56 Based on the "grandfathering"
approach, the BIA announced that "no additional contract support funds will be
requested for such [new fiscal year 1985] contracts." 57
The "grandfathering" approach was abandoned for fiscal year 1988, and the
Bureau proposed to fund every contractor at a "flat rate" of fifteen percent.

Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs (Operations) to Area Directors (May 21, 1984).
51. F.Y. 1986 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-103.
52. Development of P.L. 93-638 106(h) DistributionFormulas,American Indian Law Center (Sept.
1983).
53. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs to Tribal Leaders, at 2 (Jan. 13, 1984).
54. F.Y. 1986 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-103.
55. F.Y. 1987 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-95.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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However, this flat rate was administered without regard to the varying
circumstances that caused different contractors to have significantly differing
indirect cost rates. 58 When it was urged to the Assistant Secretary of Indian
Affairs that a small Indian-controlled school located in an extremely remote
location (Black Mesa) could not possibly operate on a fifteen percent
administrative cost rate, he responded: "Well, your client shouldn't be in
business. ' 5 9 The flat rate approach was struck down by the Interior Board of
Contract appeals, 60 and the BIA abandoned it even before it was implemented.61
Congress heard objections to the imposition of a flat rate and other
deficiencies in the allocation of contract support funding during hearings held in
1986 on House bill, H.R. 4174, amending the ISDEAA. Specifically, these
included the failure to honor negotiated indirect cost rates, under-funding of the
amounts required to fund BIA negotiated overhead costs, and the problem
presented by "theoretical over-recovery." 62 The bill reported by the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs also addressed theoretical overrecovery and required federal agencies other than BIA and IHS to honor
negotiated overhead agreements with tribes. The bill also rejected the flat rate
approach by requiring annual negotiations of the amount of contract support costs
to be added to BIA and IHS program funding. Further, the bill made clear that
funding level issues were subject to tribal appeal rights, which the agencies had
denied.
In addition to the studies and approaches noted above, the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs and the DOI Assistant Inspector General for Audit
issued a significant report on tribal indirect costs and contract support on
September 30, 1987, which was prompted by an initiative by the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The Assistant Inspector General concluded
that tribes had been underfunded in fiscal year 1985 in the amount of $14 million
and made specific recommendations to address the problem. These included:
(1) removing the restrictions preventing non-BIA and non-IHS agencies
from fully reimbursing negotiated indirect costs;
(2) authorizing the BIA to negotiate lump sum agreements to fund all
indirect costs on federal grants and contracts; and
(3) budgeting and providing full funding to BIA for negotiated lump sum
agreements. 63

58. F.Y. 1988 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-27 and BIA-96.
59. Correspondence and meeting with Ross Swimmer, Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs (October
24, 1986) (on file with authors).
60. Appeal of Alamo Navajo Sch. Bd., 25 IBCA 114 (Feb. 24, 1988).
61. F.Y. 1989 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-104.
62. Hearing on H.R. 4174 Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong.
(1986). The OIG had been assuming that tribes collected the full amount of indirect costs from federal
agencies, even when these agencies refused to honor the rates, thus creating a "theoretical" or, more
properly, a fictitious over-recovery which tribes were required to pay back.
63. Audit of Methods for Reimbursing Indian OrganizationsforIndirect Costs Incurred, President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (1987). These 1987 recommendations address the issues raised in
Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Babbitt, 112 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1997), a class action in which the BIA was

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss2/5

10

Dean: Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal
CONTRACTSUPPORT

2000]

The Assistant Inspector General identified the reason for the contract
support shortfall to be the fact that "the budget request submitted by the Bureau
of Indian Affairs to Congress did not include sufficient funds to cover the
anticipated indirect costs." 64 It should be noted that the BIA supported the idea
of eliminating restrictions on other agencies paying their fair share of indirect
costs, but said that the OMB should take the lead in reaching this result, not the
BIA.
2.

Early IHS Efforts.

While the ISDEAA applies equally to BIA and IHS, the two agencies have
interpreted the requirements to pay "contract support" and "indirect costs"
differently under both the original legislation and the subsequent amendments
(discussed below). Initially, the IHS did not establish a budget line item for
"contract support." Instead, the IHS allocated funds on a recurring basis to Area
Offices to address the additional funding needs of contracting tribes. In some
instances, tribal organizations were required to institute litigation to assure that
such additional funding was provided.65
In its report on the fiscal year 1984 appropriation bill, the House
Appropriations Committee stated:
The Committee is concerned about other difficulties encountered by tribal
contractors, particularly with regard to the provision of indirect costs. The

Committee requests IHS to review its procedures to determine if changes are
needed in those procedures. A particular issue that should be addressed is whether

a specific line item should be established to provide indirect costs for new tribal
contracts. The Committee understands IHS currently has no mechanism for
providing these costs, with the result that newly contracted6 6programs must be
reduced if required indirect or support costs are to be provided.

While the IHS filed a report with Congress in response to its contract
support concerns, it did not separately identify contract support as an item in its
fiscal year 1985 budget request. Although it did separately identify tribal
management funds that tribes had used to prepare for contracting, the budget
request simply confirmed that Public Law No. 93-638 was yielding gratifying
results in Indian self-determination and described the usefulness of tribal
management funding in assisting tribes to contract. Then it proposed the
elimination of the tribal management fund for fiscal year 1985 in an effort to focus
IHS resources on key medical care services. 67
However, in its fiscal year 1986 budget request IHS stated its policy to pay
indirect costs "based on the indirect cost rates established by the cognizant
agency, not by IHS" and requested $5,000,000 for the administrative costs of new
held liable for the payment of such other-agency indirect costs.
64. Id.
65. See Tanana Chiefs Conf. Inc., v. Heckler, No. 84-1756, 11 ILR 3093 (D.D.C. 1984) (mem.).
66. H.R. REP. No. 98-253, at 96 (1983).
67. F.Y. 1985 IHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-26.
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self-determination contracts.' s In subsequent years, IHS has generally identified a
separate amount to pay "contract support" costs for new contracts.
C.

CongressionalRecognition of the Need for ContractSupportFunding in
1988 and 1994.

Enactment of the 1988 Amendments to the ISDA. The Senate Indian Affairs
Committee undertook a major review of the contract support issue following an
oversight hearing held on April 22, 1987. During the hearing, numerous tribal
representatives pointed out the adverse impact on tribal self-determination of the
failure to fund the full negotiated indirect costs of self-determination contracts. In
Senate Report No. 100-274, the Committee laid out in detail its conclusions based
on this review. As already noted, it described the failure of the BIA and the IHS
to provide funding for tribal indirect costs as "perhaps the most serious problem
with the implementation of the Indian self-determination policy. 69 It objected to
tribes being forced to subsidize the operation of federal programs in order to
exercise their rights under the ISDEAA. The Committee had requested the BIA
to produce any evidence of the improper manipulation of indirect costs described
in the 1983 AILC study, but the Bureau was "unable to substantiate these
charges." 70 The DOI Inspector General had ascribed the increase in indirect costs
to the entirely appropriate efforts of
tribes "to improve their administration and
71
comply with federal requirements.",
The Senate determined not to employ the term "contract support,"
previously used in BIA guidelines and budget requests, but instead to require the
BIA and the IHS "to comply with the requirement of the Act that indirect costs
be added to the amount available for direct program costs." The Senate Report
was reluctant to use the term "contract support" because it had not been
operationally defined; whereas "indirect costs" was a term well understood and
defined in OMB guidelines governing the negotiations of indirect cost agreements.
While the Senate Committee clearly intended to address the "shortfall" by
mandating full funding of the costs termed "contract support costs", its adoption
of the term "indirect costs" to calculate the amount of funding which should be
added to program costs for self-determination contracts would have left several
issues unresolved. 72
In accordance with procedures established by OMB, the Senate bill defined
"indirect costs" as costs which are incurred for a common or joint purpose or not
readily assignable to specific contract objectives, and it mandated that these costs,
together with direct costs, should be fully funded.7 3 The system incorporated into
the Senate bill was consistent with BIA's initial determination in the 1977

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

F.Y. 1986 IHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-37.
S. REP.No. 100-274, at 8 (1987).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 8-13.
S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 33 (1987).
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guidelines that all indirect costs would be funded from contract support funds
because they were administrative in nature. However, the 0MB system for
allocating direct and indirect costs had not been developed for establishing a
contractual right to additional funding; it was developed for the purpose of
allocating a fixed amount of funding awarded to a contractor or grantee between
direct costs chargeable to the particular funding source and indirect costs to be
paid from a pool to which multiple funding sources contribute.74
Theoretically, this could mean that a cost not considered "contract support"
could be funded as an indirect cost and paid from contract support funds, although
the Committee's review had concluded that this kind of "manipulation" had not
taken place. In addition, the Senate bill would have barred contractors from
receiving additional funds for items of cost which were clearly within the
definition of "contract support" (costs for activities which the federal agency did
not perform or for which funding was provided from another source) but which
did not meet the definition of "indirect costs" under the OMB guidelines.
Since the House bill (H.R. 1223) to amend the ISDEAA, like its
predecessor, H.R. 4174, included a statutory definition of "contract support costs"
and required that such costs be added to the amount the Secretary would
otherwise have provided for his direct operation of the program, it was necessary
for the two different approaches to be reconciled in Public Law 100-474, the 1988
amendments to the ISDEAA. The House definition of "contract support costs"
(which reflected the definition of contract support in the principles laid down in
Chapter 6 of the 1977 BIA Procedural Guidelines) was included in the final
language of the amendment in section 106(a)(2) which requires that "contract
support costs" shall be added to the Secretarial funding level stated in section
106(a)(2). As amended in 1988, however, the Act incorporated the Senate bill's
definitions of "direct costs" and "indirect costs" and included a directive to add
"indirect costs" to the direct program costs, paralleling the directive to add
"contract support." In 1994 the specific "indirect costs" directive was eliminated.
75

Thus the Act, as amended in 1988, barred the agencies from adopting a flat
rate for indirect costs, perpetuated the original BIA policy of using indirect cost
negotiations as the method for establishing the additional funding which a tribal
contractor should receive over and above the program funds being contracted, and
raised an issue as to the funding of an item of cost qualifying as "contract
support," but not meeting the definition of "indirect costs." Most significantly,
however, it directed the Secretary to add "contract support" and "indirect costs"
to the Secretarial funding level of any contract program.
1. The 1994 Amendments.
Congress further amended the ISDEAA in 1994 to provide additional
support for the tribal effort to obtain full funding of contract support. An

74. See supra note 38.
75. See id. §§ 450j-1(a)(2), 450b(f), 450b(g), 450j-1(c)(2), and 450j-I (2000).
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additional declination criterion was added to section 102 of the Act to make clear
that a disagreement over the amount of funds to be awarded was subject to the
same declination appeal and hearing rights as any other ground advanced by the
federal agency for declining to contract (overruling an IHS view that a contract
proposal is not being declined if the agency is willing to approve it at a lesser
funding level than the tribe proposed).76 A further amendment clarified the right
of a tribe to go forward with performance of a contract while taking a declination
appeal on discrete issues as to which agreement had not been reached. The
burden of proof in declination appeals was placed on the federal agency and final
decisions rendered by a Department official higher than the BIA, IHS, or by an
administrative judge, thus assuring meaningful appeals.
In addition, the funding level provisions of section 106 were modified to
provide a statutory basis for the recovery of contract support funding as "direct
costs," (as long recommended by the DOI Inspector General) and the rights of
Indian tribes to negotiate contract support on an annual basis (thus barring a
mandatory "grandfathering" approach) was confirmed by amendment. A
provision was added which required that start-up costs on a one time basis must be
included in the negotiated amount of contract support. Finally, a provision was
also added giving the federal district courts the authority to provide injunctive
relief to reverse a declination finding and to compel the federal agencies to award
and fund an approved self-determination contract. All contract disputes under
self-determination contracts would go to the Interior Board of Contract Appeals,
including appeals from IHS decisions. 77
These amendments enacted by the Congress in 1988 and 1994 strengthened
significantly the tribal ability to challenge the underfunding of negotiated contract
support costs. However, the continued growth in self-determination contracting
and the failure of the Congress to appropriate sufficient funds to cover anticipated
contract support costs led to a continuation of the contract support controversy.
D. IHS and BIA Policy After the "ContractSupport" Amendments.
Following the enactment of the 1988 amendments to the ISDEAA, IHS
developed new policy guidelines governing the award of contract support funds,
which were issued as Indian Self-Determination Memorandum No. 92-2 ("ISDM
92-2") on February 27, 1992. The IHS guidelines followed BIA in providing for
the use of contract support appropriations to pay for all negotiated indirect costs.
IHS distributed the amount it had available to meet each contractor's ongoing
indirect cost requirements based on an annually negotiated rate and established
an Indian Self-Determination Fund ("ISD Fund") which would be used to provide
contract support funding in the first year of a tribal contract. However, IHS also
authorized the use of contract support funds to pay "direct costs" which qualified

76. See, e.g., Appeal of the Southeast Alaska Regional Health Corporation,IHS Contract Proposal
Declaration Appeals Board, May 15,1985.
77. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450j-l(a)(3)(A), 450j-l(a)(3)(B), 450j-1(a)(5), and 450m-1 (2000).
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under the contract support definition in section 106(a)(2).
IHS officials
recognized that the law now required the addition of "contract support" whether
or not the costs qualified as indirect costs under federal procedures governing the
negotiation of indirect cost rates.
The IHS also departed from BIA policy by not distributing all contract
support funding pro rata, but as the shortfall increased year by year, establishing
the principle that requests for funding for new or expanded contracts would be
approved based on the earliest receipt date. In the subsequent revision, which
produced IHS Circular 96-04, the IHS established more formal procedures for
contract support funding on a first come first serve basis, including a list of
unfunded contract support requests, which became known as the "queue" list.
In contrast, the BIA did not develop a formal policy on contract support.
Instead, the BIA continued to issue annual guidance to govern the distribution of
contract support funds appropriated by Congress. Under annual guidance, the
BIA practice has been to distribute all contract support funds on a pro-rata basis,
except funds for new and expanded contracts, which (like the IHS practice under
ISDM 92-2 and IHS Circular 96-04) are paid from an ISD Fund on a first-come,
first-serve basis. As discussed below, the BIA has also refused to pay direct
contract support, despite the clear language of the 1994 Amendments*78
In another aborted move to reform the contract support mechanism, the
BIA twice announced a plan to divest the Inspector General of the responsibility
for negotiating indirect costs for ISDEAA contracts and transfer that
responsibility to the Office of the Secretary. 79 The BIA indicated that the Office of
the Secretary would employ "reasonableness" as a criterion in establishing such
rates. It was not explained what expertise existed in the Office of the Secretary to
negotiate indirect costs. This plan was never implemented.80
E. Barriersto Recovery of ContractSupport Costs.
1.

Insufficient Appropriations.

Insufficient contract support funding has been a reality for tribal contractors
since the ISDEAA was enacted in 1975. However, the shortfalls in contract
support funding became particularly acute in the 1990s, due primarily to the
failure of Congress and the Administration to fund contract support associated
with the increase in contracting that was the intended result of the 1988 and 1994
amendments. 81
Indeed, what ensued appeared to constitute a duel between the authorizing
committees and the appropriations committees over this issue. For fiscal year
1994 the Congress earmarked a specific sum for BIA contract support
78.
79.
84.
80.
81.

65 Fed. Reg. 10,100 (Feb. 25, 2000).
F.Y. 1989 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-81; F.Y. 1990 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIAF.Y. 1991 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-89.
See GAO Report, supra note 5, at 25-26.
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($91,223,000) and established a cap.s2 Previously the BIA had been able to
reprogram other unused funds (which would have been returned to the Treasury if
not expended) to make up for shortfalls in the contract support budget term. 3
The shortfall for BIA programs increased dramatically from nine percent in
fiscal year 1994 to twenty-three percent in fiscal year 1997 (a shortfall of $26.5
million). 84 Similarly, contract support shortfalls for IHS programs were relatively
modest before fiscal year 1995. However, beginning in fiscal year 1996 "rapid
growth in self-determination contracting activities, coupled with static
appropriations for the IHS's Indian Self-Determination Fund and no increases for
inflation, led to sharp increases in contract support shortfalls." 5 By fiscal year
1997, the backlog of requests for contract support funding for new and expanded
contracts from the IHS' ISD Fund had reached over $35 million, 86 with a shortfall
of $15 million for ongoing contracts (not including inflation and other mandatory
increases). 87
The Administration attempted to address these dramatic shortfalls in its
budget request for fiscal year 1997. It requested an increase of $46.1 million in
contract support funding for IHS programs ($12 million for the ISD Fund, $1.5
million for inflationary increases, and $32.5 million for ongoing shortfall)f and
$19.8 million for BIA programs.8 9 While these increases would have reduced the
contract support shortfalls for IHS and BIA programs, Congress refused to
appropriate the amounts requested. Instead, Congress appropriated $7.5 million
for the IHS' ISD Fund and $5 million for the BIA's ISD Fund, but nothing for the
shortfall for ongoing contracts. 9°
Congress' unwillingness to grant the increases requested by the
Administration appeared to be, at least partially, the result of concern that the
increases were due to higher indirect cost rates (presumably due to contractor
inefficiencies) and not to greater legitimate need. As stated in the House
Appropriations Committee Report for fiscal year 1997:
The Committee again expects HIS to work with the tribes, the BIA and the
Inspector General and the Department of the Interior to contain the cost escalation
in contract support costs. In today's constrained budget climate the contract support
cost activity must receive its fair share of administrative streamlining and
procurement reform funding reductions as well as lower inflation allowances

82. Pub. L. No. 103-138, 107 Stat. 1391 (1993).
83. H.R. REP. No. 102-505, at 16 (1996).
84. National Congress of American Indians: National Policy Work Group on Contract Support
Costs, at 63 (July 1999) (hereinafter "NCAI Report").
85. Id.
86. Report to Congress On ContractSupport Cost Funding in Indian Self-Determination Contracts
and Compacts, at 4-5 (IHSMay 1997).

87. Id. at 6-7.
88. F.Y. 1997 IHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-120.
89. F.Y. 1997 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-48.
90. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-192;

3212-13 (1997).
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91
provided for all other programs within I-S.
To respond to this directive, the IHS convened its Contract Support Cost
Workgroup ("CSCWG") in late 1996 to study the reasons for the escalation in the
need for contract support funding. In May 1997, the HIS submitted the report of
the CSCWG to Congress. According to the report, indirect cost rates had been
relatively stable. 92 The main reason for the increasing need for contract support
funding was more contracting by tribes:
The directive from the Congress to the IHS suggests Congress believes that the
reason for the rapid growth in the need for CSC has been from increases in the
negotiated IDC rates of the tribes (the contractors), and the tribal IDC rates
increase in response to increases in appropriations of contract support funding. This
is not the case. More than any otherfactor, this rapidgrowth in appropriations
and unmet need in CSC is the result of the tribes' contracting additional PSFAs
under P.L. 93-638.

[There has been] ... a modest rate of increase in CSC funding compared to the rate
of increase in IHS PSFAs transferred to tribes through self-determination contracts
and self-governance compacts. Implementation of the recent amendments to the
ISDA facilitated the contracting process and clarified the right of tribes to assume
PSFAs carried out at IHS Headquarters and Area Offices. Since 1993, the number
of assumptions of IHS PFSAs and the amount of funding
93 transferred through
contracts and compacts has increased at an accelerated rate.
While tribal contractors might have thought this report would lead to
significantly more funding to address the huge shortfalls,94 the response by the
Administration and Congress was disappointing. The Administration reversed
course from the previous year and only requested modest increases for fiscal year
1998 - $12 million for the -IS' ISD Fund (but no funds for ongoing shortfall) 95 and
$15 million for BIA contracts ($5 million for ISD Fund and $10 million for
ongoing shortfall). 96
Congress also refused to address the mounting shortfalls. For IHS programs,
Congress only funded $7.5 million of the Administration's request for the ISD
Fund.97 For BIA programs Congress provided the amount requested for BIA

91. H.R. REP. No. 104-173, at 91 (1996) (The "constrained budget environment" cited by the
Committee likely referred the more stringent appropriation limits then in place). See, e.g., Balanced

Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 (1997) (Thus, increased appropriations for contract support
generally had to come at the expense of the funding for another program subject to the jurisdiction of

the Interior Appropriations Subcommittees).
92. In the course of its work, the CSWG discovered a GAO report that the average indirect cost
rate average for 118 universities receiving grants for scientific research was 50.5% in 1995, far above
the average rate for ISDEAA contracts with IHS. U.S. GeneralAccountingOffice, University Research.
Effect of Indirect Costs Revisions and Options for FutureChanges, GAORCED 95-74, at 3 (1995).
93. Report to Congress On ContractSupport Cost Funding in Indian Self-Determination Contracts

and Compacts, at 4 (INS May 1997) (emphasis in original).
94. See GAO Report, supra note 5, at 25 (By fiscal year 1998, the contract support shortfalls had
reached crisis proportions - $70 million for IHS and $25 million for BIA).
95. F.Y. 1998 IHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-115-16.
96. F.Y. 1998 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-49.
97. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
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programs. 9 However, this still left a shortfall of nearly twenty percent.
By early 1999, the projected IHS shortfall had increased dramatically.
According to a report to Congress by the NCAI, the shortfall for ongoing IHS
contracts was $27 million and $59.9 million for new and expanded contracts. 99 The
shortfall for ongoing BIA contracts was still projected at nearly twenty percent
(about $24 million),Y°°
With contract support shortfalls so enormous (especially for IHS programs
and at least in comparison with previous years), the entire policy of Indian SelfDetermination was at risk. Nevertheless, the Administration requested no
increase for contract support for IHS programs in its fiscal year 1999 budget
request.01 The failure to request any funds'02 was especially disturbing since the
budget request expressly noted that the increased need for contract support was
due to more contracting and not to excessively high indirect cost rates:
Amounts available have been inadequate to meet the demand of [sic] which has
resulted from the additional contracting related to the passage of the 1994 ISDA
amendments ....
In 1997, the Congress directed the IHS to "work with Tribes, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the Inspector General at the Department of the Interior to contain the
escalation in contract support costs." In response to this directive, the IHS

developed a "Report to Congress on Contract Support Cost Funding in Indian SelfDetermination Contracts and Compacts." The preliminary findings of the report,
based on analysis of tribal indirect cost rates, indicated that rates have remained
relatively stable and have not unreasonably escalated. The report further indicated

that the continued increase in contract support cost need is due primarily to the
increased assumption by tribes of new programs, services, functions and activities
from the IHS. The Office of the Inspector General within the Department of
Interior reached a similar conclusion as a1 3result of an analysis it conducted of a
sample of tribes over an eight-year period.

0

Against this bleak backdrop, the National Congress of American Indians
("NCAI") mounted a greatly intensified effort during the fiscal year 1999 budget
process to focus Administration and Congressional attention on the crisis facing
Indian Tribal Self-Determination as a result of the worsening contract support
shortfalls. This effort met with mixed results.
First, for fiscal year 1999, Congress appropriated an unprecedented increase
in contract support funding for IHS programs of $35 million. 104 While this was a
83, 111 Stat. 1543.
98. Pub. L. No. 105-83.
99. NCAI Report, supranote 84, at 5.
100. Id. at 4.
101. See F.Y. 1999 IIHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-118.
102. The Administration did request a $9 million increase for BIA contract support ($5 million for
the ISD Fund and $4 million for shortfall). See F.Y 1999 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-11.
103. F.Y. 1999 IHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-119.
104. Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, provided critical
support for this increase in a letter to Senator Slade Gorton, Chairman of the Senate Interior
Appropriations Subcommittee. He urged that "No pro rata distribution of contract support costs for

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss2/5

18

2000]

Dean: Contract Support Funding and the Federal Policy of Indian Tribal
CONTRACT SUPPORT

significant victory, the amount provided was still less than 'the total shortfall which
was estimated at nearly $93.4 million.10 5 Moreover, Congress only increased
contract support funding for BIA programs by $4 million.'06
At the same time, Congress imposed a high price for these increases. Most
significantly, Congress took the unprecedented step of imposing a moratorium for
fiscal year 1999 on new contracting and compacting of both IHS and BIA
programs. For the first time in twenty-five years, the policy of Indian tribal selfdetermination was brought to a halt.1°7
Further, report language was added that urged the IHS to change its system
for distributing contract support to correct perceived "inequities." According to
the Conference Report:
The conference agreement does not include statutory language mandating a pro rata
distribution of contract support costs across all Service self-determination contracts
and self-governance compacts. This language was included in both the House and
Senate bills but has been dropped because of concerns expressed by tribal
organizations and many individual tribes. The Committees remain convinced that
the current distribution methodology employed by the Service for contract support
costs is inequitable and fiscally unsound. The Committees' proposal for a pro-rata
distribution, in combination with a one-year moratorium on new contracts and
compacts and additional funding for existing contracts and compacts, would have
provided a permanent solution to the problem.
The Committees have added more than $35 million to the Administration's budget
request to address the inequity in the distribution of contract support cost funding in
fiscal year 1999. The Committees direct the Service, in cooperation with the tribes,
to remedy this inequity in the fiscal year 2000 budget request. The remedy cannot be
a large infusion of additionalfunding for contract support costs at the expense of
either critical health programs or critical constructionneeds of the Service. Further,
the Committees note that the one-year moratorium on new contracts and compacts
cannot be extended indefinitely. The Committees believe strongly that an
acceptable permanent solution to the contract support cost distribution inequity
3
must be a party of the fiscal year 2000 budget request from the Administration.1
This language was the result of concern by some in Congress that the IHS
system was unfair because IHS awarded contract support funds for new and
expanded contracts based on the date of request. Thus, some contractors were
receiving all or most of their contract support requirements (such as those whose

Indian Health programs which would take funds away from existing programs" due to the severe
impact on existing health programs which a redistribution of contract support would have. He also
touched on a key theme in the history of contract support: "I believe it is important to maintain good
relations with the authorizers in this area." See Letter from Senator Ted Stevens to Senator Slade
Gorton (Nov. 8, 1998).
105. Indian Health Service Contract Support Cost Data Presentation to House Subcommittee on
InteriorAppropriations,at 2 (Jan. 22, 1999).
106. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998).
107. See id.
108. H.R. REp. No. 105-825, at 1233-34 (1999) (emphasis added).
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queue requests had already been paid) while others received little or no contract
support funding (particularly new contractors that had not yet reached the top of
the queue list).
The Procrustean'09 solution to "solve" this problem noted in the Conference
Report was to distribute all contract support funding on a pro-rata basis, as is
done by the BIA for its ongoing contracts.1
However, this proposal was
uniformly opposed by tribal leaders because it would have been very damaging to
many existing programs, some of which would have lost nearly twenty percent of
their contract support funding under a pro-rata allocation. It was also seen by
many tribal leaders as fundamentally unfair for the United States to pay its
contract support obligation to one group of contractors by taking funds from
another group of contractors, many of whom were also underfunded."'
While the effort to impose a pro-rata distribution was defeated, the IHS
decided to address the concern about "inequity" by distributing the $35 million
increase for fiscal year 1999 in a new manner that was inconsistent with the queue
system under its existing policy. 112 Instead of giving priority by date of request to
those tribal contractors that had been waiting on the queue list for years, the IHS
distributed the $35 million based on the overall shortfall (queue request and
ongoing) of all tribal contractors."3 Based on the percentage of shortfall of each
tribal contractor, the funds were distributed so as to bring the floor level of
funding to the highest possible level. As a result of this distribution, all tribal
contractors were funded at no less than eighty percent of need. 114 However, some
contractors that had reached the top of the queue list did not receive any
additional funding since their overall funding level was above the floor percentage,
even when IHS had contractually obligated itself to pay specific amounts on the
queue when funds became available.

109. Procrustes was a figure in ancient Greece who invented the Procrustean bed to establish
equality by decapitating tall people and stretching short people. Theseus, founder of Athens, slew him
by the same method. 1 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS, at 6 (Modem
Library 1992); THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VIII, 1414 (1933).
110. Interestingly, the BIA also uses the queue system for new and expanded contracts. However,
the amount of funding provided for the BIA's ISD Fund has generally been sufficient to pay all
pending requests, so a backlog of requests has never developed.
111. See Statement of Phillip Martin, Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians on H.R. 4148
before the House Resources Committee, 2 (May 16,2000). As stated by Chief Martin:
We are aware that the self-determination and self-governance efforts of many tribes have
been undermined by the failure of both BIA and IHS to fully fund negotiated contract
support costs. We have never seen the sense of IHS negotiating the "reasonable amount" of
these costs (as section 106(a)(2) requires) and then paying some lesser percentage of that
amount to a tribe. We appreciate the widespread support provided by tribes across the
country which have opposed efforts to transfer contract support funding from some tribes to
other tribes in order to meet the obligation of the United States under the ISDEAA to fund
these costs in full.
Id.
112- See IHS Circular 2000-01, supra note 38. (In fact, IHS Circular 96-04 remained in effect
throughout FY 1999 and was not superceded by IHS Circular 2000-01 until January 20,2000).
113. See Letter from Dr. Michael Trujillo, IHS Assistant Surgeon General, to Tribal Leader (Oct. 8,
1999) (hereinafter Trujillo letter).
114. F.Y. 2001 IHS Budget Justifications, at IHS-127.
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The distribution method utilized by the IHS did accomplish the goal of
eliminating the vast differences in funding levels between contractors. However,
the total shortfalls were still at crisis levels. As Congress was considering the fiscal
year 2000 appropriation bills three significant reports on contract support were
completed. The first report, by the General Accounting Office ("GAO"),
certified again that the need for more contract support was due to more
contracting and not higher indirect cost rates. According to the GAO:
Over the past decade, increases in indirect costs have been responsible for the
majority of the increase in funding for contract support costs. The need for indirect
cost funding has increased due to increases in the dollar amounts contracted from
BIA and IHS coupled vith increases in tribes' indirect cost pools. Across all the
indirect cost rates negotiated by [the Department of] Interior's Office of Inspector
General, the aggregate indirect cost rate has remained relatively stable over the past
10 years at just under 25 percent. However, appropriations have not been sufficient
15
to reimburse tribes for their costs of administering BIA's and IHS' programs.
The second report was issued by the National Congress of American
Indians: National Policy Work Group on Contract Support Costs the following
month. This report, which the authors assisted in drafting, detailed the history of
contract support under the ISDEAA and made 16 recommendations to improve
the contract support system. Many of these recommendations have been
incorporated into a legislative proposal to amend the ISDEAA discussed below.
The report urged that the moratorium should be ended and that "Congress must
in 1988 and
not retreat from its commitment in 1975, repeated and strengthened
n6
again in 1994, to provide full funding for contract support costs.""
In June 1999, the BIA contract support report developed in cooperation
with Tribal representatives reached the same general conclusions as the NCAI
study. It concluded that contract support problems resulted from "insufficient
annual appropriations; and administrative and statutory limitations imposed by
other funding sources ... ." It urged "increasing contract support funding 7to meet
the Act.""1
the Bureau's full funding obligations under section 106(a)(2) of
For fiscal year 2000, NCAI once again led the effort to increase funding for
contract support and to end the moratorium; both of these efforts were successful.
With Administration support, Congress agreed to increase contract support
funding for the HIS by $25 million (of which the IHS allocated $10 million for the
ISD Fund and $15 for ongoing shortfall) and for the BIA by $5.3 million (of which
$5 million was for the ISD Fund)." s In addition, a renewed attempt to impose
pro-rata distribution of IHS contract support funding was also defeated.
After extensive tribal consultation, the IHS adopted a new contract support

115.
116.
117.
Costs

GAO Report, supra note 5, at 25.
NCAI Report, supra note 84, at 16-18.
Report of the BIA Tribal Workgroup on Tribal Needs Assessment: A Study of ContractSupport
in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Recommendations for Reform, Executive Summary, at 9

(June 1999).
118. See F.Y. 2001 BIA Budget Justifications, at BIA-51.
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policy (IHS Circular 2000-01) on January 20, 2000, to supercede IHS Circular 9604. Under the new policy, all contractors with new and expanded programs for
that fiscal year are considered for funding from the ISD Fund based upon their
overall level of shortfall. As was the case in fiscal year 1999, the funding is
distributed to the requests so as to bring the floor funding level to the highest
possible percentage. Any amount not paid from the ISD Fund is added to that
contractor's ongoing shortfall. Any shortfall funds are distributed so that all
contractors that are underfunded have an equal percentage of their shortfall
funded.1 9 For example, if there are sufficient funds to pay 50% of the total
shortfall for all tribal contractors, then a contractor funded as 98% would receive
an additional 1% (50% of two) while a contractor at 60% would receive an
additional 20% (50% of 40).
The $25 million increase for fiscal year 2000 was distributed pursuant to the
terms of IHS Circular 2000-01. According to IHS, no IHS contractor received less
than 90% funding in fiscal year 2000.120 For BIA, all contractors were funded at
88.55% in fiscal year 2000.121 For fiscal year 2001, the specter of a freeze on
contracting again reared its head, this time on the House side. However, the
House recommendation for a moratorium was rejected in conference. Instead,
the Congress provided a $20 million increase, of which $10 million was earmarked
for new and expanded contracts. The conference report also urged the Office of
Management and Budget to work with BIA and IHS to eliminate inconsistencies
between the BIA and the IHS methods of calculating and distributing contract
support. The Congress continued the caps on contract support for both BIA and
IHS which were upheld in the Oglala Sioux and Miccosukee cases by the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Language which the federal agencies have
argued prohibits the use of current appropriations to pay contract support
obligations from past years was also continued.
For the BIA side the Congress provided $3.25 million less than the
Administration requested in ongoing contract support notwithstanding the
Administration's estimate of a 12% shortfall (or $16.9 million). However, $5
million was provided for contract support for new or expanded contracts.
Language was continued permitting the tribes to dip into program funds to pay
indirect costs which contract support funding is insufficient.
The fiscal year 2001 legislation also includes a provision adopted on the
Senate floor which expresses the sense of the Senate that the cost of the Ramah
Class judgment should be borne by the programs which failed to provide indirect
costs in full to the plaintiffs in the period covered by the judgment, rather than by
the Indian programs of the BIA or the IHS.
While the increases in fiscal years 1999, 2000, and 2001 have eased the crisis

119. See IHS Circular 2000-01, supra note 38, § 41B(3).
120. IHS presentation at a meeting of the IHS Contract Support Workgroup held in San Diego,
California (June 14,2000).
121. Update 2000 FINAL OIP ContractSupport, BIA Office of Self-Governance (Headline News,
Aug. 22,2000).
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facing the Indian self-determination policy due to inadequate contract support
funding, the future is unclear. First, it is plainly unreasonable for the agencies to
determine "an amount for the reasonable costs" of contract support required by a
contractor to administer a federal program, but then pay the contractor some
amount less than what is reasonable. 122 Whether the shortfall is five percent or
25%, the end result is a penalty on contracting that results in the diversion of
program funds to pay required administrative/overhead costs, or a penalty for
contracting which tribes must make up out of tribal funds.
For the long term, the Committee report language in fiscal year 1999,
rejecting the idea of large increases in contract support funding, does not bode
well for the future of Indian self-determination (because the process of
transferring operation of IHS and BIA programs to tribes is far from complete).
According to the GAO, as of fiscal year 1997, sixty-four percent of BIA programs
are under contract, while only forty-five percent of IHS programs are tribally
operated.123 The GAO roughly projects that if tribes contract the 24remaining
programs, the need for contract support could increase by $375 million.
Certainly, there are minor changes that could be made to improve the
process for determining the amount of contract support required by a contractor
with greater precision, and to possibly improve contractor efficiency. Such
changes, which might increase or decrease the amount of contract support
required, should be made. However, the only long-term solution to contract
support shortfalls that is consistent with the federal policy of Indian selfdetermination is for Congress to fully fund the amount of contract support that is
required to avoid imposing a financial penalty for contracting. If these amounts
are not funded, the likely result is that many tribes will determine that the price in
diminished services extracted for exercising their right to contract under the
ISDEAA is simply too high. In short, the success of the federal policy of
encouraging tribal self-determination for all tribes will be significantly postponed.
Thus, in deciding whether to fully fund contract support, the critical question
is whether the United States desires Indian programs to be administered by
federal bureaucrats, or whether it truly intends to "permit an orderly transition
from the Federal domination of programs for, and services to, Indians to effective
and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and
administration of those programs and services. ' 5
2.

The failure of the BIA to Comply With the ISDEAA
Requirement to Pay Direct Contract Support.

Since the 1970's both BIA and IllS have utilized the negotiation of indirect
cost rates as the principal method of determining the amount which should be

122. See 25 U.S.C. § 450j-l(a)(2) (1994) (under this section, a tribal contractor is to receive "an

amount for the reasonable costs of expenses that meet the definition of contract support").
123. GAO Report, supranote 5, at 37.
124. Id.

125. 25 U.S.C. §450a(b) (1995).
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added to a self-determination contract under section 106(a)(2) as "contract
support costs" notwithstanding the fact that the two terms are not coextensive.
One of the problems resulting from the identification of contract support costs
with indirect costs is that costs clearly qualifying as contract support may not be
allowable as indirect costs because they are considered "readily assignable to the
cost objective specifically benefited without disproportionate effort."
The 1994 ISDEAA Amendments specify that "contract support costs" may
be either direct or indirect, 26 but the BIA has refused to follow the statute.127 The
BIA's failure to pay direct contract support is also inconsistent with the applicable
regulations.'28 As noted by the GAO: "Despite BIA's position on direct contract
support costs, the joint regulations require that contract proposals contain "an
identification of the amount of direct support costs .... [C]onfusion still exists
because BIA has not changed its position on direct contract support costs to
follow the new regulations."' 129
Although during hearings last year on Capitol Hill Assistant Secretary
Gover indicated that he was willing to reconsider the policy of refusing to pay
contract support funds to cover direct costs, the BIA has continued to refuse to do
so. 130 The result of the BIA policy is that tribes may be underfunded for contract
support because the OIG will not put a contract support item in the indirect cost
pool, and the BIA will not use contract support funds to pay it unless it is in the
pool. This inconsistency between statutory law and the policies of the OIG and
13
the BIA exacerbates the funding shortfalls noted above. '
Recently, a class action lawsuit was filed against the BIA to force it to
comply with statute.1 For purposes of mediation, this case has been consolidated
with the ongoing Ramah Navajo Chapter class action, which could greatly speed
resolution of this issue. It is estimated that the direct contract support costs for

126. 25 U.S.C. § 450j-l(a)(3)(A) (1995).
127. The IHS instituted a policy of allowing contract support funding to be provided for direct costs
in the late 1980s, which is retained in the present IHS policy on the payment of contract support. See
IHS Circular 2000-01, supranote 38.

128. See 25 C.F.R. § 900.8(h)(2) (2000) (noting that contract proposals should identify "the amount
of direct contract support costs").
129. GAO Report, supra note 5, at 47. The GAO further noted that the BIA has been inconsistent
in its position:
In a 1993 memorandum to all BIA area directors, contract officers, and budget officers, the
acting Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs stated that the payment of certain direct
contract support costs could be justified under the Indian Self-Determination Act, but that
BIA did not have sufficient contract support funding to pay for these costs.

Id. at 47.
130. See 65 Fed. Reg. 10,100 (2000); GAO Report, supranote 5, at 47-48. ("[O]n February 24,1999,
in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Resources, the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs stated that BIA is reexamining its position on direct contract support costs

and 'will evaluate tribal requests for payment of certain direct costs"').
131. In other words, a twenty percent shortfall noted by the BIA actually means that the contractor
is receiving less than eighty percent of its true contract support requirements, since the BIA has not
included direct contract support in its shortfall calculation.
132. Pueblo of Zuni v. United States, Civ. No. 00-0365 LH-WWD (D.N.M.) (2000).
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BIA programs are between $10 and $30 million per year.133
While the Pueblo of Zuni case could force the BIA to begin paying direct
contract support, it is nothing short of outrageous for the BIA to require tribes to
expend their scarce resources to file litigation to force it to comply with the plain
language of the ISDEAA and the regulations.1 3 The fact that the BIA does not
currently have sufficient resources to fund direct contract support costs in full does
not justify the BIA's efforts to pretend that these costs somehow do not exist.
Only by accurately identifying these costs can Congress know the true amount of
shortfall and thus the amount that is required to avoid penalizing tribes for
electing to contract under the ISDEAA.
3.

Administrative and Statutory Barriers That Prevent Other Federal
Agencies From Honoring Indirect Cost Rates.

For many years the BIA and IHS (through the Department of the Interior
Office of the Inspector General and the Department of Health and Human
Services Division of Cost Allocation) have calculated indirect cost rates in a
manner that assumes that all federal agencies with funds in a contractor's indirect
cost base will honor the negotiated indirect cost rate. The reality, however, is that
many federal agencies (such as the Department of Labor and Department of
Education) severely limit or prohibit the use of grant funds to pay administrative
costs. 135 Nevertheless, by including funds from these agencies in the base, the BIA
and IHS have artificially deflated the applicable indirect cost rate and thus their
own contract support obligations.
In other words, if there is $500,000 in the base and the indirect cost pool is
$100,000, then the contractor needs a rate of 20% to fully recover its indirect costs
(20% times $500,000 equals $100,000). If an additional $100,000 is added to the
base from another federal agency, the $100,000 for the indirect cost pool (which is
largely inelastic) could be generated by applying a rate of 16.7% to the $600,000
base-the BIA would pay $83,500 (16.7% times $500,000) and the other federal
agency would pay $16,700 (16.7% times $100,000). If the 16.7% rate is applied but
the other federal agency does not honor it due to an administrative or statutory
bar, the BIA will have reduced the amount of contract support it pays the
contractor by $16,700, but the contractor will have no way to recover this amount
from the other federal agency. As a result, the contractor will have to make up
this shortfall, usually by diverting BIA program funds.
This practice was found to be illegal in the class action case of Ramah Navajo
Chapterv. Lujan.136 According to the Court:

133. See GAO Report, supra note 5, at 48. For the current status of the Ramah Chapter and Zuni

litigation, see supra note 138.
134. See supra notes 122 and 124.

135. See A Study of ContractSupport Costs in the Bureau of IndianAffairs and Recommendationsfor
Reform, Report of the BIATribal Workgroup on Tribal Needs Assessment, Chapter 4 at 16-17 (June

1999) (providing a partial list of such limitations).
136. 112 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1997).
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[D]efendants included in the direct costs base the funds plaintiff received from the
United States Department of Justice (via the State of New Mexico) for criminal
justice and juvenile offender restitution programs. Although inclusion of these
funds in the direct costs base would have been proper if those programs included
funding for their apportioned share of the indirect costs pool, the uncontroverted
facts indicate they did not. By including the DepartmentofJusticefunds in the direct
costs base, defendants effectively and knowingly reduced the amount of funding they

would provide to plaintiff to cover the indirect costs pool and thereby deprived

plaintiffoffull indirectcosts funding for fiscal year 1989.137

Claims for fiscal year 1989 - 1993 were settled by the parties for $76 million

(plus pre-judgment interest). 138 The parties are currently discussing settlement of
the equitable portion of the claim, so as to conform the method for calculating
indirect costs to the law of the case. A possible settlement under consideration
would require the BIA to pay a portion of the shortfall roughly proportional to
the amount of BIA funds in the contractor's indirect cost base. This settlement
proposal recognizes that contract support costs are not completely inelastic, as
well as the fact that Congress has recently amended the ISDEAA to prohibit the
use of BIA and IHS contract support funds to pay the contract support
requirements generated by other federal agencies.

9

While this settlement would help to generate a more accurate picture of the
contract support needs of tribal contractors, it would not directly generate any
additional funds. Thus, it will be up to the Administration and Congress to
address the more accurate shortfall, which will appear to be significantly larger
than before (although the need existed all along).
More problematic, however, is the fact that this settlement would only
identify a portion of the shortfall created by other federal agencies that do not
honor negotiated indirect cost rates. As noted above, the indirect cost rate
applicable to the BIA would only be increased in proportion to the percentage of
BIA funds in the indirect cost base. Thus, tribal contractors that have relatively
less federal funds in their indirect cost base would see less benefit from this
settlement, even if Congress funds the newly identified shortfall.
This larger problem can only be addressed through legislation because many
other federal agencies are prohibited by statute from paying more than a modest
level (if any) of administrative costs. From a political standpoint, it will be
difficult to obtain legislation to force every federal agency that provides funds to
tribes to honor negotiated indirect cost rates and add this amount to the amount
of program funds that would otherwise be provided to the tribe. These agencies

137. Id. at 1463 (emphasis added).

138. See 63 Fed. Reg. 57,700 (1998). Resolution of the claims for 1994 through the present requires
interpretation of appropriation language that Congress began adding in fiscal year 1994, which the BIA
argues caps the amount of funds available for contract support for those years as well as its liability for
any underpayment (whatever the reason). The most recent development in this case is that the parties
have agreed to mediation and former Senator George Mitchell has agreed to serve as mediator.
Mediation began on November 21,2000. Interview with Patti Jamison, Attorney-Advisor, DOI Office
of Inspector General (Nov. 21, 2000).

139. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450j-2, j-3 (1999).
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are under the jurisdiction of many separate Congressional committees with
competing interests.
One way to ensure that all tribal contractors that operate non-BIA and nonIHS programs have their contract support costs fully funded is for Congress to
designate the BIA (or the IHS if the contractor is not operating BIA programs) as
the entity through which the contractor is to recover all of its contract support
requirements that result from the operation of other federal programs (to the
extent not provided by those other federal agencies). Of course, this would
significantly increase the contract support requirement for the BIA (and the IHS).
At the same time, the need is already there and to the extent that tribes are not
permitted to recover their costs from other federal agencies, they often must
divert BIA and IHS program funds for this purpose. Thus, providing these funds
is necessary if the policy of the United States is truly to prevent tribes from being
penalized for contracting under the ISDEAA.
E. A Legislative Solution.
On March 30, 2000, Congressman Don Young of Alaska and Congressman
J.D. Hayworth of Arizona introduced H.R. 4148, the first legislative attempt to
address head-on the divergence between the self-determination legislation
developed by the authorizing committees and enacted by the Congress and the
annual appropriations legislation coming out of the appropriations committees
and enacted by the same Congress.' 40 The sponsors agreed that: "Despite its
successes, the policy of self determination has been consistently plagued by
problems, with the most severe being the failure of the IHS and BIA to fully pay
contract support costs associated with carrying out these federal government
programs under duly executed contracts.' 141 They accepted the Congressional
obligation to pay contract support. Congressman Young described the present
posture of the contract support issue as "a cruel hoax" on the Native American
people being served under these contracts.
The tribal contractors Alaska... [sic] know that when they enter into a contract to
operate a federal program locally, they will only be receiving a meager amount to
meet the overwhelming needs of their communities. But what has made the
situation much worse for these courageous tribal contractors, is that the agencies
have forced the contractors to absorb the administrative costs of operating the
Federal Government's own programs. The net effect is that there is even less

140. Although litigation has succeeded in forcing some improvements to the contract support system,
the only viable long-term fix is legislation. As noted by Chad Smith, Principal Chief of the Cherokee

Nation, which is actively litigating contract support issues:
We do not believe that litigation is an efficient way to resolve funding problems. Although

litigation may be our only option for dealing with the past, the current situation is untenable
and cries out for attention from Congress.
The Tribal ContractSupport Cost: Hearing on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. On Resources, 106th
Cong. 2 (2000) (testimony of Chad Smith, Principal Chief of the Cherokee Nation).
141. 146 CONG. REc. E462-463 (daily ed. March 30, 2000) (statement of Congressman J.D.
Hayvorth).
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available in these woefully underfunded programs to meet local needs.

The new proposal essentially asserts that "shall add" in section 106(a)(2) of
the ISDEAA means "shall add." It proceeds on the assumption that it makes no
sense for the federal government to have a mechanism to determine the
"reasonable amount" of contract support costs to assure that tribes do not pay a
financial penalty for exercising self-determination rights, legislate that the DOI
and the DHSS shall add that amount to self-determination agreements, and then
in annual appropriations mandate that only some lesser percentage of the
"reasonable amount" of such costs shall be paid.
The key provision of the bill makes clear that the federal commitment to
fund negotiated contract support costs is not subject to annual determinations
made by Congress in the appropriation process. Instead, the bill provides a
permanent indefinite appropriation to assure that funds are available to pay the
"reasonable amount" of such costs as negotiated. Language subjecting the
commitment to pay contract support to the availability of appropriations would be
eliminated. As reported by the House Resources Committee on June 28, 2000,
the bill (although modified in some other respects) retained this key language.
Enactment of these provisions would assure the fulfillment of the commitment,
which the federal government apparently made to Indian tribes when it amended
the ISDEAA in 1988 to add subsection 106(a)(2).143 While it would not solve all
the problems associated with the delivery of services to Indian people, such as
remoteness of location, divergences in cultural values, and the underfunding of the
programs themselves, it would at least make clear that programs operated by the
tribes under the ISDEAA stand on a level playing field with programs provided
directly by the federal bureaucrats. 144
The bill as reported also addressed a number of other contract support
142. 146 CONG. REc. E462 (daily ed. March 30,2000) (statement of Congressman Don Young).
143. See The Tribal Contract Support Cost: Hearing on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. on
Resources, 106th Cong. 2-4 (2000) (testimony of Gene Peltola, President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Yukon-Kuskokwim Health Corporation).
I cannot emphasize enough how critically important Section 3 is to the success of the SelfDetermination policy this country has carried out for over one-quarter of a century. That
policy cannot work if the government is to turn over its trust programs to Alaska Native and
American Indian Tribes, and then pull a fast one, turn around and force the tribes to pay for
those programs themselves.

That only cheats the tribes and punishes the people being

served. It's not how the country deals with other government contractors, be it General
Electric or Boeing, and it is not the way the country should deal with Indian Tribes and the
recipients of federal trust services.
Id. at2.
144. See Babbitt v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Pub. Safety Dep't, 194 F.3d 1374, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(Gajarsa, J., additional views). It has been suggested that the failure by Congress to provide sufficient
funds to reimburse tribes for their contract support costs might amount to a breach of trust by the
United States:
If the federal government is to carry out its trust responsibility, it is incumbent upon the
Secretary to seek and request the necessary funds in the appropriation process and for the

Congress to appropriate those funds. Failure to do so by the Secretary and the Congress, in
and of itself, may be considered a breach of the federal government's fiduciary obligation to
carry out its trust responsibility.
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issues. It authorizes negotiated rulemaking on the allowability of costs under the
ISDEAA. This provision addresses the position of the DOI Inspector General
that section 106j) special rules on allowable costs do not apply to an indirect cost
pool which includes non-ISDEAA funds, as well as ISDEAA funds. The bill also
includes a provision to remove present limits on the ability of tribal contractors to
recover legal costs in administrative appeals under the ISDEAA. Further, the bill
clarifies that contractors are entitled to recover pre-award and start-up costs
incurred in previous years, despite the IHS' position that the annual
appropriations cap on contract support bars recovery. 145
The need for legislation assuring fair and equitable funding of reasonable
contract support costs will be required so long as significant portions of BIA and
IHS programs continue to be administered directly by the federal agencies.146 In
some respects, the bill, as originally introduced and reported, can be refined to
address peripheral contract support issues, but the centerpiece of a permanent
appropriation should not be dropped. The bill should also include the
administrative costs of BIA-funded grant schools as recommended by several
Indian witnesses since such costs stand in the same relationship to tribally
operated schools as contract support costs due to non-educational BIA and IHS
funded tribal programs. 47 A form of "grandfathering" was included in the bill by
provisions to consolidate contract support funding with program funding after the
first year. This provision allows adjustments for inflation, transfers of federal
employees, and permits deconsolidation based on increases of program funds
exceeding twenty percent. It has substantial tribal support. However, in our view
this approach should be optional for tribes in the light of the impact on indirect
costs of changing circumstances over which tribes have no control.14
Perhaps the most serious refinement that needs to be made if the
145. See The Tribal Contract Support Cost: Hearing on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. on

Resources, 106th Cong. 3-4 (2000) (testimony of Richard P. Narcia, Lieutenant Governor Gila River
Indian Community). On October 18,2000 the House passed H.R. 4148 but made significant changes.
As passed by the House, it would not establish a permanent indefinite appropriation but would address

several present contract support problems including:
(1)

allowing tribes to recover their full indirect costs from non-638 federal agencies unless
prohibited by statute;

(2) apply the special cost principles in § 106(K) to all federal agencies;
(3) transfer responsibility for contract support matters at IHS to the Office of Tribal Programs;
(4) require payment of pre-award and start-up costs in previous years.
Since no action was taken by the Senate, a legislative approach to contract support remains on the
agenda for 2001. 145 Cong. Rec. H10026-H10028, (Oct. 17, 2000); 145 Cong. Rec. H10082 (Oct. 18,
2000).
146. For example, a recent analysis by the IHS shows that while some Areas are almost entirely
contracted (such as the Alaska Area at 98.2%) others have seen very little contracting (such as the
Tucson Area at 13% and the Navajo Area at 10.4%). PercentageofIHS Areas under P.L. 93-638: IHS
Spreadsheet for Contract Support Workgroup (July 19,2000).
147. See Statement to the House Resources Committee Regarding the Impact of H.R. 4148, Tribal
Contract Support Cost Technical Amendments of 2000, On Tribally-Operated Schools, Submitted

Jointly by the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians and eight other tribal entities that operate BIAfunded schools (May 16,2000).
148. See, e.g., The Tribal ContractSupport Cost Hearing on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. on

Resources, 106th Cong. 3-5 (2000) (testimony of Ron Allen, Vice President, NCAI and testimony of
Richard P. Narcia, Lieutenant Governor Gila Giver Indian Community).
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"entitlement" provision is retained is language to assure that the payment of
contract support as required by the bill is not offset by reductions in programs
funds. Such an offset would, of course, have the diametrically opposite effect from
that intended by the bill's entitlement provisions. Both BIA and IHS submitted
testimony indicating opposition to the bill based on this concern which is why the
provision was dropped by the House.149 While there can be no absolute guarantee
with respect to Congressional appropriation actions in future years, the bill should
include a provision making clear that contract support funds awarded to tribes are
meant to supplement and not replace program funds provided under section
106(a)(1) of the Act. The bill should also prohibit the Office of Management and
Budget from making estimates under section 252(d) of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.150
Notwithstanding these concerns, the bill's sponsors and the House Resources
Committee should be commended for this serious effort to address a deficiency in
federal tribal self-determination policy that has been around for twenty-five
years. 5 If Congress acts on this legislative proposal in the next session, the result
may clear the decks for the forward movement of tribal self-determination and
self-governance, and the more rapid elimination of the old system under which
local government issues in the Indian country remain in the hands of federal
bureaucrats appointed by and subject to the whims of the Department of the
Interior and the Department of Health and Human Services, rather than being
democratically elected by the Indian and Alaska Native communities being
governed.
CONCLUSION

In addressing the National Congress of American Indians in 1999, Assistant
Secretary Gover reminded Indian tribes of how their political influence has
increased. "The 2000 election may mark the first time when the major parties
really compete for Indian votes and endorsements. We have friends on both sides
of the aisle. We are at a strong starting point. 152 Tribes have indeed come a long
149. See The Tribal Contract Support Cost: Hearing on H.R. 4148 Before the House Comm. on

Resources, 106th Cong. 3 (2000) (testimony of Michael H. Trujillo, M.D., M.P.H., M.S. Assistant
Surgeon General Director, Indian Health Service) ("We are concerned that funding for this
entitlement would have to come from existing or future appropriated IHS funds and supercede the
other critical priorities for budget increases for tribal health programs .... "). Kevin Gover, Assistant
Secretary of Indian Affairs, stated the following in his testimony:

The bill's language could be construed to compel federal agencies to redirect program funds
from other recipients or operations to meet the full contract support payments of Indian tribes
and tribal organizations. We do not believe that the Committee intends this consequence since
it would be disruptive to so many federally-supported state and local government services.
Id. at2.
150. See id. at 4 (testimony of Phillip Martin, Chief, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians).
151. As noted by Chief Smith:
H.R. 4148 remedies almost all of the most severe problems in the current contract support

system in a thoughtful and carefully considered way, without demolishing the entire
foundation of the Indian Self-Determination Act.
Id. at 3 (testimony of Honorable Chad Smith, Principal Chief of Cherokee Nation).
152. Statement of Assistant Secretary Kevin Gover to the National Congress of American Indians:
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way since the National Congress of American Indians was organized to fight
termination in the 1950's.
Significantly, on June 27, 2000, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of
the federal policy of Indian tribal self-determination, the Senate of the United
States passed Senate Resolution No. 277 sponsored by Senators Campbell,
Johnson, McCain, Inouye, Domenici, Inhofe, Wellstone and Dorgan. The
resolution passed unanimously. The resolution, like Chairman Cypress of the
Miccosukee Tribe, described the policy as "the most successful policy of the
United States in dealing with the Indian tribes." The resolution praised the policy
because "it rejects the failed policies of termination and paternalism...
recognizing that cultural pluralism is a source of strength." It praised the vision
and leadership of President
Nixon in initiating the policy and of every succeeding
15 3
President in fostering it.

In view of the broad bipartisan support for tribal self-determination and selfgovernance in the United States Senate, Indian tribes may reasonably expect that
the critical issue of contract support funding will be addressed by the Senate in the
next session of the Congress and that a companion Senate bill to House Report
4148 will be introduced and move forward in the Senate. There is, therefore, a
chance that this longstanding impediment to a fully successful tribal selfdetermination policy could be removed and that the present impasse between the
authorizing committees on the one hand, and the appropriations committees on
the other, can be definitively resolved. Such action by the Congress would
conform to the principle so eloquently stated in dissent by Justice Hugo Black:
"Great nations, like great men, should keep their word."' 54

"From Fear to Hope" (October 7, 1999).
153. See S. Res. 106-277, 106th Cong. (2000).
154. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
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